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I. INTRODUCTION
A denial of Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)
will be upheld if it the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
is supported by "substantial evidence." In practice, the application of
the substantial evidence standard has varied as the Seventh Circuit has
struggled over the degree of deference that should be accorded to the
ALJ's findings. This is particularly true in cases that require the
administrative law judge to evaluate impairments with highly
subjective effects, as well impairments that must be considered in
combination to determine disability.1 The Seventh Circuit's recent
decision in Gentle v. Barnhart advances a vision of the substantial
evidence standard informed by the broad objectives of the Social
Security's disability program, an approach that emphasizes the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. I would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, John G. New, Devin
McComb, and Stacy Manning for their assistance with this note.
1
See e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (subjective
experience of pain); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (combined effect
of multiple impairments, none of which rise individually to the level of disability).
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investigatory burden on the ALJ over deference to the ALJ in her
adjudicatory role.2
First this note will provide an overview of how the Social Security
Administration evaluates disability claims and how claimants can
appeal an adverse decision. Next this note will survey the debate
within the Seventh Circuit over the application of the substantial
evidence standard in social security disability law and the level of
deference accorded to factual findings by the ALJ.3 This will be
followed by a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit's most recent
decision in Gentle v. Barnhart extends the line of reasoning that more
vigorously questions whether an adverse decision is supported by
substantial evidence. In this decision, the Seventh Circuit placed a
heavy emphasis on the investigatory responsibilities of the
administrative law judge. This approach gives slightly less deference
to factual findings by the ALJ where coming to those conclusions
requires a subjective evaluation, for example, evaluating the credibility
of the witness. Finally, this note will conclude that although this
approach slightly weakens deference to the adjudicatory role of the
ALJ in favor of a somewhat heavier burden the ALJs in her
investigatory role, this approach is consistent with the language and
the goals of the Social Security Act.
II. BACKGROUND
Applying for Social Security Disability benefits can be a complex
process, particularly if the applicant's claim is rejected initially. A
person insured by Social Security who becomes disabled may apply
for disability insurance benefits (DIB) after a waiting period of five
months following the onset of the disability.4 The prospective
applicant then has a one year window in which to file a claim with the
2

430 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2005).
The cases selected for discussion have been chosen because they illustrate the
debate through the contrasting reasoning offered in the majority and dissenting
opinions. This is not intended as an exhaustive survey of cases in which the Seventh
Circuit has applied the substantial evidence standard.
4
42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (2004).
3
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Social Security Administration (SSA).5 To be considered disabled, a
person must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment .
. ."6 The applicant must be unable to continue their "previous work" or
"engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy" where jobs that the claimant can perform exist
in significant numbers in the regional economy.7 The disability must
be "medically determinable."8 It also must be relatively permanent: to
qualify as a disability, it must be expected either to result in death or to
last for a continuous period of at least one year.9
Disability is evaluated using a five-step evaluation process.10 If a
claimant is found to be disabled or not to be disabled at any step, the
analysis ends.11 First, the SSA examiner or ALJ asks whether an
applicant is involved in substantial gainful activity; if so, that person
will not be considered disabled.12 There are exceptions to the rule.
Make-work provided by an indulgent employer is not considered
gainful activity because such employment is not proof of
employability.13 Neither is employment taken out of desperation.14
The second step is to consider whether any medically
determinable physical or mental impairments, individually or in
combination, meet the duration requirement for severity.15 To be
considered disabled, the disability must be expected to persist for at

5

42 U.S.C. § 423(b) (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004).
7
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2004).
8
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004).
9
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004).
10
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006) (explaining five-step sequential evaluation
process).
11
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2006).
12
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). (2006)
13
Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1998).
14
Id.
15
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2006).
6
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least one year.16 Qualitative severity is evaluated in the third step.17 If
any impairment meets or equals the severity of one of the impairments
listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, the claimant will be
considered disabled.18
If the claimant is not considered disabled at step three, the SSA
will make a determination of the claimant's residual functional
capacity for use in steps four and five.19 Residual functional capacity
is the most work a claimant can do within the claimant's limitations.20
It is determined through an assessment of the claimant's physical
abilities, mental abilities, environmental restrictions and the total
limiting effect of all impairments and symptoms.21 The fourth step
considers whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work
given her residual functional capacity.22 If the claimant can perform
her past relevant work despite her limitations, she will not be
considered disabled.23
Finally, in the fifth step, the examiner or ALJ determines whether
the claimant is able to make an adjustment to other work24 based on
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.25 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 lists medical-vocational guidelines
("grids") that may be used to assess whether a claimant should be
considered capable of substantial gainful employment for purposes of
social security disability benefits based on physical abilities, age and
education. For example, under Table No. 1, illiteracy, advanced age,
and a work history of unskilled work would together direct a finding
16

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2006) (incorporating by reference duration
requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509) (2006).
17
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (2006).
18
Id.
19
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2006).
20
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2006).
21
Id.
22
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (2006).
23
Id.
24
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (2006).
25
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1) (2006).
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of disability, presuming the claimant's limitations prevent her from
performing her past relevant work.26 Alternatively, or where the grids
do not apply because a mental residual functional capacity must be
considered, a vocational expert may be called to testify to how many
jobs are available in the regional economy that can be performed by
the claimant, taking the claimant's limitations into account.27
A. Review of the Initial Determination
If the Social Security Administration determines that a claimant is
not disabled, the claimant may challenge that determination through an
administrative review process.28 First, the claimant may ask for
reconsideration.29 If the claim is denied upon reconsideration, the
claimant has the right to a hearing before an ALJ.30 The ALJ is
responsible for a unique type of administrative review. The
administrative review hearing is a non-adversarial process.31 Although
the claimant has a right to be represented by counsel,32 the
Commissioner of Social Security is unrepresented at the hearing.33
The ALJ has an investigatory role as well as a quasi-judicial role.
While the claimant has the opportunity to offer evidence of disability
by submitting medical records and testimony,34 the ALJ has a duty to
investigate facts and develop the issues through the course of the
hearing.35 The ALJ has multiple tools for developing the record. The
ALJ reviews records and hears testimony from witnesses, including
26

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1(2006).
69 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 § 66 (2005).
28
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (2006).
29
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)(2) (2006).
30
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)(3) (2006).
31
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2006).
32
See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (2000).
33
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000).
34
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935, 404.949, 404.950 (2006).
35
Sims, 530 U.S. at 111 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-401
(1971)).
27
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medical experts, friends and family of the claimant, and the claimant
himself.36 The examiner has great latitude to conduct the hearing in a
relatively informal manner, considering even evidence that might be
excluded as hearsay in a more formal judicial proceeding.37 Where
additional evidence is required, the ALJ has the discretion to order
additional medical and psychiatric examinations.38 A medical advisor
may be called upon to review the medical records and offer her
professional opinion.39
If the ALJ denies the applicant's claim, the applicant may appeal
to the Social Security Appeals Council.40 If the claimant is not
satisfied with the Council's decision, the claimant may seek
administrative review in federal court.41
The ALJ's determination of whether a claimant is disabled, and
ultimately the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, must
be supported by "substantial evidence."42 Reviewing courts are to give
the findings of the Commissioner, and in effect the ALJ, conclusive
weight in questions of fact where those factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence.43 That the record contains enough information
to support an ALJ's decision is not sufficient: the ALJ has an
obligation to write a detailed explanation the decision, one that
"build[s] an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the]

36

See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 ("The hearing
examiner shall inquire fully into the matters at issue and shall receive into evidence
the testimony of witnesses and any documents which are relevant and material to
such matters . . .”)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (2006).
37
Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 ("The … procedure at the hearing generally
. . . shall be in the discretion of the hearing examiner and of such nature as to afford
the parties a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing."))
38
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519, 404.1519a (2006).
39
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 408.
40
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(4) (2006).
41
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(5) (2006).
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
43
Id. ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive … .") (emphasis added).
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conclusion."44 Courts are authorized "to enter … a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing."45
However, a reviewing court may award benefits only where "all
factual issues have been resolved and the record supports a finding of
disability."46
B. Construing "Substantial Evidence"
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner has
noted a tension in the interpretation of social security disability law
between empathy and economy, an ideological split between "those
who empathize with the humane objectives of the law and those who
worry about fostering dependence and depleting the federal budget."47
He observes that these perspectives in the field are divided by
fundamental questions of value, questions not easily resolved by
appeals to a neutral observer.48 While Judge Posner noted this in the
context of discussion of the wisdom of reforming the review process
44

Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dixon v.
Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting reasons for a decision
supplied by the Commissioner's lawyers rather than by the ALJ in her report).
45
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
46
Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005). In Briscoe, The
Seventh Circuit clarified the circumstances under which a reviewing court may
award benefits rather than reversing and remanding for proceedings consistent with
the court's decision. The confusion among the district courts arose from the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Wilder v. Apfel. Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 356 (citing Wilder v.
Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1998)). In Wilder, the Seventh Circuit awarded
benefits where the agency failed to bring forth contradictory medical evidence
despite a second hearing following remand from the district court. The Court of
Appeals "found it necessary to 'bring the charade to an end'" and awarded benefits to
the claimant. Id. However, in Briscoe, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
"obduracy" on the part of the ALJ is not in itself sufficient grounds for an award of
benefits by a reviewing court. Id.
47
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 253
(1996).
48
Id.
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by establishing specialized courts,49 a similar division comes into play
in the interpretation of the substantial evidence standard. The
following cases illustrate the tension between an ideal of economic
and judicial economy, which tends to afford maximum deference to
the factual findings of ALJs, and an empathetic desire for meaningful
review under the substantial evidence standard.
This tension between economy and empathy in interpreting the
"substantial evidence standard" is not new. It is evident in the Supreme
Court of the United State's 1971 decision in Richardson v. Perales, in
which the Court considered whether medical reports by physicians
who have not been cross-examined, presenting evidence that
contradicts live testimony favorable to the claimant, constitute
substantial evidence supporting a finding adverse to the claimant.50
Richard Perales challenged whether the unsworn, hearsay reports were
constitutionally sufficient evidence.51 He claimed that because he had
not had the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of these medical
reports, these reports should not have been admitted as evidence.52
Mr. Perales' presented evidence of his impairments in the form of
testimony by one of his treating physicians and reports created by two
others physicians who had personally examined him.53 Initially, Mr.
Perales presented somewhat weak medical evidence that he was
disabled due to a back injury.54 Mr. Perales had undergone back

49

For further critiques of the current system of review and a survey of
proposed solutions, see Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative
Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 731 (2003).
50
Richardson, 402 at 390.
51
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 395, 398. Initially, Richardson challenged the use of
unsworn reports as a violation of the Confrontation clause. The Court eventually
addressed his claim as a procedural due process issue: "The question, then, is as to
what procedural due process requires with respect to examining physician's reports
in a social security disability claim hearing." Id. at 402.
52
Id. at 395, 398.
53
Id. at 395-96.
54
See id. at 390-92.
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surgery in an attempt to relieve his back pain.55 However, his surgeon,
Dr. Munslow, was not able to definitively identify the source of his
pain at surgery.56 Following the surgery, he diagnosed Perales'
condition a "nerve root compression syndrome, left."57 His final
diagnosis before discharging Perales was "neruitis, lumbar, mild."58
Similarly, Dr. Lampert, a neurologist was unable to identify a
neurological explanation for his pain.59 Following Dr. Lampert's
diagnosis, Dr. Munslow recommended that Perales return to work.60
Perales visited a third physician, a general practitioner named Dr.
Morales.61 Dr. Morales hospitalized Perales for his back pain.62 He
eventually diagnosed Mr. Perales with a moderately severe
lumbosacral back sprain and with a possible ruptured disc.63
After Mr. Perales applied for Social Security disability benefits,
the agency ordered an additional medical examination by an
orthopedic surgeon.64 The results undermined Mr. Perales' claim.65 The
examiner concluded that although Mr. Perales did indeed have a back
sprain, he was exaggerating his symptoms.66 The surgeon suggested
that Mr. Perales had exacerbated his problems by failing to exercise.67
He also suggested that there might be a psychological component to
Mr. Perales' illness.68

55

Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 391.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 392.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 393 n.3.
67
Id. at 392.
68
Id. at 393 n.3.
56
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Mr. Perales' claim was denied and he requested reconsideration.69
Dr. Morales submitted a report stating that Mr. Perales had never fully
recovered from his prior back surgery, and that he was as badly off
physically as he had been before the surgery.70 He believed that Mr.
Perales was not malingering.71 He concluded that the injury was
permanent and that Mr. Perales would not be able to continue working
in his past line of work as a laborer.72 The state agency administering
the DIB program also arranged for a psychiatric evaluation of Mr.
Perales.73 Dr. James Bailey reported personality difficulties, but no
separate psychiatric illness.74 After the agency denied Mr. Perales'
claim a second time, he requesting a hearing before a hearing
examiner.75
Mr. Perales presented direct evidence of disability at his hearing:
Dr. Morales testified as to the seriousness of Mr. Perales' condition,
and Mr. Perales himself testified.76 The ALJ also admitted reports from
Drs. Langton, Bailey, Mattson, Lampert, as well as the hospital
records, over objections from Mr. Perales attorney, who objected to the
hearsay nature of the evidence.77
Dr. Morales' conclusions were contradicted by Dr. Lewis A.
Leavitt, an independent "medical advisor" called by the hearing
examiner.78 Based on his review of the medical reports, Dr. Leavitt
testified that Mr. Perales' back problems were mild and were of
musculo-ligamentous origin rather than the result a disc injury.79 He
also testified that Mr. Perales' problems might in part be only
69

Id.
Id. at 393.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 394.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 395.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 396.
79
Id.
70
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minimally psychological.80 Faced with conflicting evidence, the
hearing examiner accepted the medical advisor's conclusions and
denied Mr. Perales' claim based on that testimony.81
Mr. Perales appealed to the Appeals Council.82 At this time he
submitted an additional medical report which had been prepared to
support a welfare claim.83 Although the examining physician, Dr.
Williams, was unable to definitively identify the source of the pain, he
concluded that Mr. Perales was 15% disabled at that time and could
probably be reconditioned to return to work.84 The Appeals Council
also denied Mr. Perales claim.85 Mr. Perales appealed in federal court,
arguing that he had been denied procedural due process because the
physician's reports on which the medical advisor relied were
uncorroborated hearsay.86 He also argued that he had not had the
opportunity to cross-examine the doctors who wrote the reports.87
A Supreme Court majority upheld the use of medical reports
without cross-examination over the protest of the dissent. These
differing views regarding the constitutional adequacy of disability
hearing procedures illustrate a subtle but persistent rift over what
constitutes a fair determination by an ALJ in a Social Security
disability hearing. The Court acknowledged that an ALJ's decision
must be supported by "substantial evidence."88 The majority was
satisfied with the probative value of the hearsay reports.89 The Court
recognized several indicators reliability. First, the non adversarial
nature of proceedings themselves give rise to a presumption of

80

Id.
Id. at 396-97.
82
Id. at 397.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 397-98.
87
Id. at 398.
88
Id. at 401.
89
Id. at 402.
81
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impartiality.90 The agency is intended to act as an adjudicator of
claims, not as an advocate or an adversary.91 Second, the majority saw
no evidence of bias in the extensive medical reports.92 It believed the
reports to be consistent.93 Further, the Court recognized a general
societal acceptance of the probative nature of physicians' reports.94
Third, with respect to cross-examination, the Court noted that Mr.
Perales had not entirely availed himself of his statutory rights.95 Mr.
Perales had failed to take advantage of a five-day period in which he
could have requested subpoenas of the authors of those medical
reports.96 Finally, the Court addressed an "additional and pragmatic
factor which, although not controlling, deserves mention."97 The Court
concluded that live testimony would be too great a drain on financial
resources of the system, particularly where subpeonas had not been
requested.98 Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Perales had not been
denied the rights of confrontation and cross-examination.99
Taking all considerations into account, the Court was satisfied
with the fundamental fairness of the system.100 The hearing process
was consistent with due process rights for several reasons. First, the
hearing did not concern a termination of benefits.101 Second, the
majority did not believe that reliance on those reports had any adverse
impact on the system's fundamental integrity and fairness because the
90

Id. at 403.
Id.
92
Id. at 404.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 405.
95
See id. at 406-07.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 406.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 407-08.
100
Id. at 410.
101
Id. at 406-07. The court contrasted the application for disability benefits
with the termination of AFDC benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
254 (1970).
91
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medical reports had probative value.102 Finally, the Court rejected the
contention that the examiner had a dual role as a judge and an
advocate, despite his obligation to develop the facts.103 According to
the Court, requiring additional examination would harm a complex
system that was working well.104 Despite the Court's assertion that cost
was merely a pragmatic matter, and not controlling, the Court's
concerns over the workability of a large and complex system loom
large in the decision.
The dissenting justices vehemently disputed whether medical
reports as interpreted by a medical advisor should be considered
"substantial evidence" sufficient to contradict live testimony from the
claimant and from an examining physician.105 The dissent noted that
one doctor, the 'medical advisor," had never seen the patient.106
Additionally, doctors in this case had serious conflicts of interest—
some had been hired by the insurance company seeking to defeat Mr.
Perales' workmen's compensation claims.107 The dissent also
questioned whether a "circuit-riding doctor[]" hired by the agency
itself to interpret medical records could be impartial.108 It blasted the
majority decision as an injustice wreaked on an individual by a
powerful bureaucracy.109 It characterized the "cutting of corners" as
contrary to the spirit of the law and beneath the dignity of a great
nation.110 Although the dissent lost on the issue of the admissibility of
unsworn medical reports, this strong empathy for claimants entangled
in administrative procedures survives as a major concern in the
analysis of the substantial evidence standard.

102

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 410.
104
Id.
105
See id. at 411-12 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
106
Id. at 413.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 414.
110
Id.
103
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C. Substantial Evidence in the Seventh Circuit
1. Smith v. Apfel
In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit the tension
between efficiency and empathy played out in a struggle over the
degree of deference accorded to the ALJ when reviewing adverse
decisions under the substantive evidence standard. In Smith v. Apfel,
Mr. Smith had been receiving Social Security disability payments for
disability due to alcoholism.111 In 1997 the Social Security
Administration changed the rules so that alcoholism was no longer a
disability.112 The SSA informed Mr. Smith that unless he could show
that alcoholism was not a contributing factor to his disability, his
benefits would cease.113 Mr. Smith requested a review, claiming that
he was unable to work because of arthritis, back pain, an ulcer, and
cirrhosis of the liver.114 Records from Mr. Smith's treating physician of
21 years confirmed some degenerative disease in his left knee and
right ankle in X-rays taken in 1987.115 In 1996 a diagnosis of
osteoarthritis was also recorded. Mr. Smith also was taking medication
for hypertension.116
Shortly after requesting review, Mr. Smith was examined by a
consultative physician, Dr. Bharti.117 Dr. Bharti confirmed
degenerative changes in Mr. Smith's right ankle but found no other
problems.118 Although Mr. Smith claimed back pain when lifting
anything over 50 pounds, Dr. Bharti noted that he had a full range of
motion in his back.119 Based on Dr. Bharti's report, state agency
111

231 F.3d 433, 434 (7th Cir. 2000)
Id. at 435.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
112

370
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/16

14

Wyder-Harshman: Between Empathy and Economy: The Struggle Over the Substantial Ev

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 1, Issue 1

Spring 2006

physician Dr. Dow determined that Mr. Smith had mild osteoarthritis
and was probably suffering from degenerative joint disease in the
lumbar area as well.120 She determined that Mr. Smith was able to
work in a job that required lifting or carrying up to 50 pounds
occasionally and 25 pounds frequently.121 A third physician, Dr.
Baraglia, also assessed Mr. Smith's records.122 He concluded that Mr.
Smith could lift no more than 20 pounds occasionally.123 He also
determined that Mr. Smith could not stand or walk for an eight-hour
work day, and could only occasionally climb, balance or stoop because
of arthritis in his knees.124 Two months later, Dr. Baraglia amended his
opinion, stating that Mr. Smith could not walk a block without severe
pain and could lift no more than 10 pounds occasionally.125 He also
stated that Mr. Smith had a limited range of motion in his back.126
At his hearing, Mr. Smith testified to his limited ability to sit in
one place or to stand for long periods of time. 127He also told the
hearing administrator that he suffered from spells of dizziness due to
his hypertension.128 He said that he could regularly lift 25 to 30
pounds but that he had trouble with anything weighing more than 50
pounds.129 In this respect, his testimony corresponded much more
closely with the evaluation done by Dr. Bharti than with the report
from Dr. Baraglia.
Mr. Smith's case presents a combination of impairments with
subjective elements, such as pain, and varying medical testimony. The
ALJ in this case took issue with Mr. Smith's credibility, and
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determined that Mr. Smith did not have pain related to arthritis.130 He
faulted Dr. Bharti for failing to order X-rays that might support his
medical opinion. He also did not consider Mr. Smith's claim of
dizziness due to hypertension.131 After hearing the medical evidence
and testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Mr.
Smith's skills were transferable to the position of forklift operator.132
Mr. Smith appealed the decision as not being based on substantial
evidence.133
In her opinion for the majority, Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner,
joined by Judge Ann Claire Williams, held that the ALJ's decision was
not based on substantial evidence.134 The court concluded that it was
impossible for the ALJ to evaluate Mr. Smith's arthritis without
updated X-rays, despite the vocational expert's information that
operating a forklift required frequent use of the right foot.135 The court
also faulted the ALJ for failing to take Mr. Smith's spells of dizziness
into account when determining that he was capable of operating a fork
lift.136 The court reversed and remanded with instructions,
emphasizing the ALJ's duty to develop a "full and fair record," and
admonishing the ALJ not to simply select and discuss the evidence
favorable to his position.137
In his dissent, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple disagreed with the lack of
deference given to the ALJ's findings, particularly to the ALJ's
credibility determination.138 He emphasized that the ALJ is in the best
position to make a credibility determination and to evaluate various
discrepancies.139 According to the dissent, to overturn the credibility
130
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determination, and all that followed, the claimant would have to show
that the ALJ was "patently wrong" in his credibility determination.140
With respect to the lack of recent X-rays, rather than taking the
omission to indicate that the ALJ had failed to develop the record
fully, the dissenter would have taken the absence of evidence as
probative of the claimant's lack of credibility.141 In short, the dissent
would have placed a higher burden on the claimant and a lesser burden
on the ALJ and deferred almost entirely to the ALJ in credibility
determinations. In a case where the ALJ considered multiple
impairments, including a subjective evaluation of pain, the majority
and the dissent emphasize distinct aspects of the ALJ's role, the
investigative and the adjudicatory, as they massage the burden of the
claimant and the level of deference to the ALJ under the substantial
evidence standard.
2. Sims v. Barnhart
Social Security disability cases are highly fact-intensive, which
can make comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, whether the court
chooses to construe the responsibilities of claimants and administrative
law judge more narrowly or more broadly depends on both the
circumstances of the case and the sympathies of the panel hearing the
appeal. In Sims v. Barnhart, a majority consisting of Judge Daniel A.
Manion and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook held that a denial of benefits
was based on substantial evidence despite the claimant's constellation
of ailments and a vocational expert's opinion based on some highly
questionable assumptions.142 The majority rejected Sims' claims that
the ALJ had not taken into account each condition, considering the
effect in combination, because the ALJ had mentioned each of these
factors in the opinion.143
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The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Sims had severely impaired renal
function and hypertension.144 She had also been to the emergency
room three times for fainting spells.145 A computed tomography
("CT") scan revealed "generalized atrophy" and "focal areas of
decreased attenuation" consistent with a history of lunar infarcts, small
lesions on the brain caused by a lack of blood flow to the affected
area.146 Ms. Sims also complained of headaches.147 She had a history
of recurrent depression, panic disorder, and agoraphobia.148 Three
Global Assessment of Functioning tests were performed; one showed
that she would have "moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or
school functioning," while two later showed "some difficulty."149 She
also had a borderline IQ score.150 However, she was able to drive to do
errands, care for herself at home and to attend church.151 The ALJ
concluded that none of these impairments alone were of sufficient
severity to meet the listed requirements.152 The ALJ questioned the
credibility of Ms. Sims' allegations concerning the "intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms," finding the
allegations inconsistent with the record as a whole.153 As a result, the
ALJ concluded that the combined effect of her impairments was also
not severe enough to rise to the level of a disability.154 After hearing
the advice of a vocational expert who concluded that sufficient jobs
were available in the economy that she was capable of performing, the
ALJ found her not to be disabled.155
144
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The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel agreed, and held
that Ms. Sims failed to show that the decision was not supported by
substantial evidence.156 The decision hinges on deference. The
majority did not discuss the ALJ's credibility determination except to
note that it would not disturb a credibility finding unless it was
patently wrong.157 Rather than reweighing the combined effect of
Sims' impairments the majority noted that the ALJ had recognized her
various complaints.158 The majority also considered itself persuaded
that the decision was supported by substantial evidence because the
ALJ had ensured that the vocational expert took the impairments into
account when determining whether jobs existed in the economy that
Sims could perform.159 Yet the majority concluded with a statement
that casts doubt on its satisfaction with the ALJ's decision, "urg[ing]
the SSA in the future to carefully examine the issue of disability in
light of a claimant's total impairments."160
In a strong dissent, Judge Richard Posner objected to how the ALJ
had assessed Ms. Sims' various conditions.161 On the basis of her
fainting fits alone, he argued, no employer would dare to hire her.162
He ascribed Ms. Sims' failure to control her blood pressure with
medication to her low intelligence rather than to willful
noncompliance.163 Further, he heavily questioned the vocational
expert's determination in several respects. The ALJ had failed to
mention Ms. Sims' hypertension and fainting fits in his in his
instructions to the vocational expert.164 The ALJ also told the expert to
take into account her high-school education.165 However, Ms. Sims
156
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had left school after the 8th grade and later earned a GED.166 The
record contained no evidence of whether her series of strokes had
impaired her mental abilities since.167 As to her ability to work, the
dissenter considered her employment too sporadic to be considered
substantial gainful employment.168 The resulting opinion from the
vocational expert, Judge Posner argued, "rests on air."169 He concluded
that the claimant was entitled to a competent examination of her
disabilities but that she had not received it.170 Judge Posner scathingly
highlights the injustice resulting from a position of extreme deference
to the adjudicatory role of the ALJ.
3. Carradine v. Barnhart
In Carradine v. Barnhart, Judge Richard Posner, from a position
in the majority, considered whether substantial evidence supported a
denial of a disability claim where the claimant subjectively
experienced severe pain but could offer no objective medical findings
demonstrating the severity of the pain.171 Patty Carradine was injured
in 1994 when she suffered a back injury as a result of a fall.172 The
back injury caused severe pain and numbness in her right hand.173 In
the course of her search for treatment with many doctors, she received
a variety of diagnoses, including "degenerative disk disease, scoliosis,
depression, fibromyalgia, and 'somatization disorder.'"174
"Somatization disorder" refers to physical distress with a
psychological origin.175
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Although Ms. Carradine presented medical evidence of her
underlying physical disorders, she could offer only testimonial
evidence concerning the severity of her pain.176 She testified to pain so
disabling that she could not work, and her husband corroborated her
distress.177 The administrative law judge acknowledged that severe
pain can be totally disabling but declined to find Ms. Carradine
disabled.178 He did not believe that her pain was as severe as she had
testified for several reasons.
Two members of the three-person panel, Judge Posner and Judge
Kenneth Ripple, agreed that the ALJ's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. This majority was willing to question the ALJ's
credibility determination, ultimately holding that the ALJ's credibility
determination was based on serious errors in reasoning rather than on
Ms. Carradine's demeanor.179 Citing law from the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Judge
Posner emphasized the difference between genuine pain with a
psychological origin and exaggerated claims of pain.180 Where the
existence of an underlying impairment is supported by objective
medical evidence, an ALJ cannot dismiss claims of pain merely
because the witness testifies to subjective symptoms.181 Pain with a
psychological origin, according to Posner, is no less real because it can
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be evaluated only subjectively.182 Judge Posner stated, "If pain is
disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not
disentitle the applicant to benefits."183 Judge Posner carefully
distinguishes between psychosomatic pain and exaggerated or
fabricated claims of pain, the second set of which do not qualify an
applicant for benefits.184 The majority accuses the ALJ of entirely
misunderstanding this distinction.185 Somatoform disorders are indeed
mentioned as disabling disorders in the Social Security regulations.186
However, this appears to be the first time this distinction has been
made in the Seventh Circuit. The majority voted to reverse and remand
for further findings over the strong objections of Judge John Coffey,
who argued in his dissent that the majority had run roughshod over
longstanding principles of deference.187
II. GENTLE V. BARNHART
In Gentle v. Barnhart,188 the Seventh Circuit steers away from the
harsh stance of the majority in Sims and the dissent in Carradine. The
unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Posner, emphasizes the burden
ALJs bear to thoroughly investigate the combined effect of various
conditions which may not individually rise to the level of a disability,
including conditions that can be evaluated only subjectively. Nicole
Gentle suffered from spinal disk disease, but her impairment was
pain.189 The pain was so severe it made it difficult for her to walk, sit,
stand, bend or turn, or to lift more than 20 pounds.190 In addition, she
182
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suffered from a number of other conditions that, while not individually
rising to the level of a disability under Social Security regulations,
combined to aggravate her pain. She suffered from serious allergies.191
She was a "slow learner" who had difficulty concentrating on complex
tasks.192 She also suffered from depression and anxiety.193 Finally, she
was obese, standing 5 feet 11 inches and weighing 275 pounds.194
She had formerly worked as a supermarket delicatessen worker
and a school lunchroom attendant.195 In 2001, she stopped working
upon the birth of her second child.196 At the time of the hearing, she
was a single mother, taking care of her eleven-month child at home
and sending her four-year-old child to preschool.197 Yet the
administrative law judge who heard her case found that she was
capable of substantial gainful employment, in part because she was
able to care for her children.198
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the ALJ to task for
failing to consider the combined effect of Ms. Gentle's various
conditions, noting that the effects of conditions must be considered
even where the underlying condition is not severe enough to be
considered a disability.199 According to Judge Posner, the social
security disability program is not concerned with health per se, but
with whether a person is capable of working.200 The court stressed that
conditions must not be confused with disabilities, and that any
aggravating health factor must be considered for its incremental effect
on disability.201 According to the court, the ALJ failed to account for
191
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how Ms. Gentle's obesity might interact with her spinal disc disease.202
Similarly, the ALJ also failed to account for how her psychiatric
problems could affect her ability to work, particularly in combination
with her disc disease and her obesity.203
The Seventh Circuit also strongly disagreed with how the ALJ had
evaluated Ms. Gentle's work capabilities. The ALJ had overlooked her
uncontroverted testimony that she performed her household tasks with
difficulty.204 The opinion emphasized that the relevant question was
not whether she could care for herself, but whether she could perform
"full-time gainful employment."205 It emphasized that a finding of
disability has more to do with the ability to obtain substantial gainful
employment than with actual health and pointed out the great
differences between the home environment and the labor market.206
Even caring for an infant, a disabled person could find times to sit
down and rest.207 However, a delicatessen worker could not miss a
couple of days a week or take a two hour break every day and remain
employed.208
The court reversed unanimously and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.209 Although the court did not
instruct the ALJ to gather additional medical opinions to develop the
record, the lack of information concerning the interaction of Ms.
Gentle's various conditions would seem to mandate further
development, particularly if the ALJ is inclined to deny benefits again
after further consideration.
The decision sends several signals to courts reviewing adverse
decisions in Social Security Disability cases. First, the court is unlikely
to be satisfied that a decision is supported by substantial evidence
202
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simply because an ALJ has listed all the factors she considered when
making her decision, as in Sims v. Barnhart. Merely following the
five-step process and writing up the results will not ensure that a
decision will be upheld. The courts will question more closely whether
the bridge between the evidence and the conclusion is a logical bridge,
making level of deference afforded to the ALJ in Sims less and less
common.
Second, the court will review decisions including an element of
subjective evaluation on the part of the ALJ, such as credibility
determination, or findings on the combined effects of impairments,
against the objective reality of a claimant's likely employability. The
analysis will consider not only whether a person is physically and
mentally capable of performing some low level of work, and whether
there are jobs in the economy fitting that description, but also whether
an employer would be likely to hire a person with the claimant's
specific impairments.
Finally, when an ALJ's otherwise well-supported opinion collides
with the objective reality of employability, courts will continue to ask
the ALJ to investigate further rather than deferring to the ALJ in his
adjudicatory role. The investigation cannot be screened off from
scrutiny by a simple application of procedure.
These trends are a subtle and appropriate adjustment to the
application of the substantial evidence standard. Because disability is
defined by employability rather than health, it is appropriate for
reviewing courts to make these inquiries. The somewhat more
empathetic analysis does not end deference. Extreme deference
undermines the fairness of the system as a whole. Rather, the approach
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Smith, Carradine and Gentle balances
deference to the ALJ in her adjudicatory capacity with the need for
oversight of the investigatory process.
CONCLUSION
Inquiries into whether a determination of non-eligibility for Social
Security Disability Insurance benefits is supported by substantial
evidence are fact-intensive. Because these complex factual patterns
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provide ample grounds for distinguishing between cases on the basis
of the facts, they tend to obscure the divide over the interpretation of
the substantial evidence standard in the Seventh Circuit. However, the
contrast in the outcomes in cases such as Sims v. Barnhart and Smith v.
Apfel and the vociferous dissents in both cases illuminate the struggle.
This divide is particularly striking where evaluation of the claim
requires a subjective evaluation of ills suffered by the claimant, or
where physicians have difficulty pinpointing the sources of those
ailments. In these close cases, the degree of deference accorded to the
administrative law judge's decision appears to vary with the guiding
philosophy of the panelists.
In Gentle v. Barnhart, the Seventh Circuit extended the
empathetic strain of interpretation which closely examines the
investigation done by the ALJ, rather than taking a position of extreme
deference toward the ALJ in her adjudicatory role. This is not a radical
departure from existing law, but a shift consistent with the language
and purposes of the Social Security Act. This decision signals that
while the court will not usurp the role of the administrative law judge,
neither will it dilute the substantial evidence standard for the sake of
economy or expediency.
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